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Incentivizing Electric Vehicles to Provide
Regulation While Recharging
Wenjing Shuai, Patrick Maille´, Alexander Pelov
Institut Mines-Telecom/Telecom Bretagne
Abstract—Electric Vehicles (EV) are drawing tremendous at-
tention, as part of the transition toward environment-friendly
transportation. While EV recharging represents a considerable
extra load on the grid, they also offer new opportunities in terms
of consumption flexibility. In this paper, we use the recharging
process of EVs to provide regulation to the grid by varying
the instantaneous recharging power. We provide an economic
analysis of the incentives at play, including the EV owners point
of view (longer recharging durations and impact on battery
lifetime versus cheaper energy) and the aggregator point of view
(revenues from recharging versus regulation gains). In particular,
we analyze the range of regulation rewards such that offering a
regulation-oriented recharging benefits both EV owners and the
aggregator. Interestingly, we observe that under current market
conditions in France, an aggregator could offer regulating EV
owners to recharge for 50% cheaper, and still be better off than
offering only constant-power recharging.
Index Terms—Smart grid, Electric vehicles, frequency regula-
tion, revenue maximization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electric vehicles (EV) can be recharged from mains power
and have the potential to greatly increase the demand for base-
load power from grid systems, according to the International
Energy Agency [1]. A key point to tackle this problem is to
consider EV recharging not only as conflicting with existing
load and a threat to the sustainability of the power grid, but
also as an enabler in the transition of the power grid to the
so-called Smart Grid. This includes the provision of services
such as: distributed energy sources, demand responses units,
and regulation service providers, which is the concern of this
paper.
In this trend, researchers examine the problem from dif-
ferent perspectives. Focusing on regulation dispatch among
EVs, Escudero-Garzas, Garcia-Armada and Seco-Granados [2]
suggest a water-filing method (originally used in information
theory to maximize the throughput over parallel channels [3])
to minimize the variance of the state of charge among user
batteries. Sun, Dong, and Liang [4], [5] develop a regulation
allocation algorithm that outperforms a greedy algorithm in
terms of long-term user welfare. Wu, Mohsenian-Rad, and
Huang model the relation between aggregator and EVs as a
Stackelberg game [6], [7], and design a pricing mechanism
to elicit EVs to voluntarily carry out the services. Among the
limitations, let us remark that users in [6], [7] are assumed
homogenous, i.e., they have identical preferences. For het-
erogenous users, a pricing design is provided by Gao, Chen,
Wang and Liu [8]: heterogeneity lies in a willingness-to-pay
parameter for (re)(dis)charging the battery. The aforemen-
tioned schemes all depend on the application of Vehicle to Grid
(V2G) technology, which allows EV batteries to discharge
energy not only to the car engines but also to all kinds of
other electricity appliances. Among the concerns about this
approach, one can ask whether users will be willing to trade
their surplus energy for money, since this increases the range
anxiety. The energy delivery efficiency and its impact on
battery sustainability are also of significant importance.
A conservative means lies in offering regulation by modu-
lating the power level during EV recharging. More precisely,
when oversupply (resp., supply shortage) occurs, regulation
down (resp., up) can be realized by raising up (resp., reducing)
the recharging power of EVs. This principle is adopted by
Sortomme and El-Sharkawi [9] for maximizing aggregator
revenue from EV owners (paying for recharging their cars) and
from the grid (paying for carrying out regulation services). In
the same vein, Leterme, Ruelens, Claessens, and Belmans [10]
design an algorithm that manages a large EV fleet assisting
wind farm to maintain a stable output.
In this paper, we propose to vary in real time the EV
recharging powers, as a response to regulation signals sent
from the local Transmission System Operator (TSO)–with
the purpose of trading for remuneration. Unlike the afore-
mentioned recharging-based regulation schemes [9], [10], we
entitle EV owners the freedom to decide whether to take the
regulating-while-recharging option, after being informed of the
stochasticity in the charging power, or to recharge at a constant
power level. Our model applies to users that are heterogenous
in terms of their sensitivity to recharging powers.
We compare two situations, with each time a revenue-
maximizing aggregator:
• in a “simple recharging (S-charging)” setting, the aggre-
gator sets a recharging price and EVs are recharged at
the maximum power;
• in a “two-options (S-charging plus R-charging)” setting,
the aggregator additionally offers EVs the choice to
recharge at a lower price, in exchange for the use of
the recharging process to provide regulation to the grid,
which we refer to as R-charging.
We study EV owners reactions to both settings, and investigate
the viability of the “two-options” scenario, together with its
impact in terms of user welfare and social welfare. Note
that in both settings, the EV owners are free to choose none
of the option(s) the aggregator offered, i.e. an alternative of
no charging is always available. We give analytical thresholds
on regulation prices above which higher revenue is guaranteed
for the aggregator by offering both recharging options.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II describes the structure of our model, with the actors
involved (EVs and the aggregator) and their preferences and
possible actions. Section III is dedicated to the optimization
of the decision parameters by the aggregator to maximize
revenue. In Section IV, we fit our model into a real world
market to see whether and when it is applicable. Section V
concludes the paper.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
We consider an aggregator in charge of several charging
stations, who purchases electricity at a wholesale price denoted
by t (in $/kWh), and then set by himself a retail price Ts (in
$/kWh) proposed to EV owners for recharging.
Statistics of vehicle usage [11], [12] point out that passenger
vehicles are parked most of the time during a day. It is
reasonable to expect a similar phenomenon with EVs, hence
a relatively low recharging power can be sufficient to fully
recharge a battery, at least for some users. This provides the
basic assumption we make, that some EV owners are willing
to accept reduced recharging power, for cheaper energy.
On the other hand, the aggregator can take this as an
opportunity to increase the revenue. Since lower recharging
power is acceptable for some clients, the aggregator can
decrease it when it is profitable to do so. This chance can
be found in the regulation market, that we describe in detail
in the following subsection.
A. Regulation mechanism
In a power grid, the aim of frequency control is to reduce the
effect of frequency disturbance caused by imbalance between
load and supply. Frequency control occurs over a variety of
time scales which can be divided into three types, namely
primary, secondary and tertiary control, with time granularity
ranging from seconds, minutes to more than half an hour
respectively [13]. In this paper, we consider varying the EV
recharging power level in order to contribute to secondary
control, also known as regulation. Primary control is not
optimal since too frequent fluctuations have a negative impact
on battery lifetime, and tertiary control is not suitable either
because the parking duration and battery capacity may not be
sufficient to respond to requests. We consider discretized time,
and refer to the time frame of one regulation session as ∆ (in
hours). Typically we expect to have ∆ within 0.1 (6 minutes)
and 0.25 (15 minutes).
EV charging being seen as a regulation resource, there
should be some margins to increase and/or decrease its
consumption. When regulation up (down) is asked by the
grid, consumption should be brought down (pushed up). This
nomenclature is counterintuitive in our context, because it was
defined for generators being regulation resources, whereas
here the task is accomplished by electricity consumers. In
our proposal, the aggregator sets a default recharging power
Pn, bounded between the minimal power 01 and maximal
power Pd set by the physical limitations of the charging
station. When no regulation is called upon, the aggregator
charges the plugged “regulating” EVs with this default power.
If a “regulation up” signal is received, the aggregator stops
charging those EVs (hence a charging power equal to 0),
whereas a “down” signal triggers full-speed recharging (i.e.,
at the maximal power Pd). We allow the default recharging
power to equal the bounds (Pn = 0 or Pn = Pd) since one-
sided regulation is also acceptable.
Although this “increase to ceiling or decrease to bottom”
policy regardless of the deviation actually demanded by the
TSO is quite arbitrary, it is reasonable because the contribution
of one single EV is negligible in the TSO’s perspective; even
aggregated EVs are not sufficient to meet this demand on their
own. For example data from RTE, the biggest TSO in France,
show that regulation demand in 30 minutes can easily go over
100 MWh [14], a quantity that could only be absorbed by at
least ten thousand EVs doing level 2 recharging (19.2kW [15])
at the same time. With the country currently counting about
30 thousand EVs with only 8600 charging facilities, we find
it unlikely that EVs may oversupply regulation capacity in
the near future; adjusting more finely the amplitude of the
charging power changes is left for future work.
Figure 1 illustrates a comparison between recharging at full
power Pd and recharging while reacting to regulation requests,
in terms of the recharging power and energy transferred to the
EV battery. We denote by CB the total energy requested by the
EV, and by ρu (ρd) the probability of occurrence of regulation
up (down), assumed independent at each regulation period in
this paper.
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Fig. 1: Power and cumulated energy an EV obtained with and
without regulation (simulation with CB =50kWh, Pd =20kW,
Pn =16kW, ∆ =0.1hour, ρu = ρd =0.45)
B. Regulation incentives
Let us turn to monetary compensations. First, the aggregator
pays ∆tPn per EV per regulation slot. In the case of “up”
regulation, the aggregator is additionally payed for reducing
demand to 0. The incentive to reduce is denoted in this paper
1We do not allow here EVs to deliver energy to the grid (the so-called
vehicle-to-grid transfer).
as a fraction ru ≥ 1 of the wholesale price: the aggregator
thus receives an amount
∆tru(Pn − 0) = ∆truPn.
In other words, the TSO “re-buys” the energy at a unit price
rut ≥ t. As for regulation down, where EVs should consume
more than planned, the TSO offers a discount ratio of rd ≥ 0
on the normal price t, so that the aggregator buys the extra
energy consumed at a reduced price (1 − rd)t, hence it only
pays
∆t(1− rd)(Pd − Pn)
per EV during each “down” period.
C. Potential revenues from regulation
Putting together all payments and the probabilities of their
occurrence, the expected revenue (possibly negative) for the
aggregator per regulation slot from one regulating EV is
Er = ∆t(ρuruPn − ρd(1− rd)(Pd − Pn)− Pn) (1)
with the notations recalled below
• t: unit price of energy at which the aggregator buys
electricity;
• ru: remuneration ratio for regulation up;
• rd: discount ratio for regulation down;
• ρu (resp. ρd): probability of an “up” (resp. “down”)
signal, ρn = 1 − ρd − ρu gives the probability that no
regulation is needed at this slot;
• Pn (resp. Pd): default (resp. “down”) charging power.
D. Aggregator strategic decisions
Initially, the aggregator’s freedom is limited to choosing
a recharging price and a recharging power, a situation we
called S-charging. Since users tend to prefer higher powers, we
simply assume that the aggregator offers the highest possible
power, i.e., the power that we denoted by Pd and which is
defined by the physical limitations of the power supply chain.
When the aggregator additionally offers the possibility to
recharge while contributing to the regulation service, it has to
select separate unit prices for EV users:
• one price Ts (in $/kWh) for EVs S-charging, at the
maximum available power.
• one price Tr (still in $/kWh) for EVs R-charging, whose
charging process responds to TSO regulation solicita-
tions.
Also, the aggregator would have to choose the default charging
power Pn, at which to charge the latter EVs when no regu-
lation signal is received. Those choices will be based on user
preferences, assumed known to the aggregator and modeled
as below.
E. User preferences
EV owners select the type of recharging that maximizes
their utility, which we define here. We assume that the energy
demand per EV per day is CB kWh, and that users tend to
prefer the no-regulation charging, for two reasons:
• they prefer to recharge faster, i.e., with higher power;
• and they are reluctant to uncertainty in the recharging
power (and hence, in the recharging duration) caused
by regulations. Additionally, batteries can be sensitive to
power variations in the recharging process, another reason
for EV owners to be reluctant to contribute to regulation.
For a recharging option, let us denote by P¯ the average
(expected) charging power and δ(P ) its standard deviation.
We define the user valuation (or willingness-to-pay) for a
recharging option as
V = θ(P¯ − γδ(P )) (2)
where θ is user-specific: a type-θ user has a general sensitivity
to power (including its variability) equal to θ. We denote
by θ¯ the average value of θ over the EV owner population.
The parameter γ represents the reluctance toward power
fluctuations, because of the unpredictability of the charging
duration and the possible damage to the battery. In this paper,
we assume γ is the same for all users, which rather favors
the latter interpretation of γ being due to technical aspects.
Interestingly, we may see an evolution of γ as the battery
technology evolves, with γ getting smaller if batteries tend to
be more robust to power variations.
For S-charging users, the power is a constant thus P¯ = Pd
and δ(P ) = 0; while for R-charging clients:
P¯ = ρdPd + ρnPn (3)
δ(P ) =
√
ρuP¯ 2 + ρd(Pd − P¯ )2 + ρn(Pn − P¯ )2) (4)
III. ANALYSIS
Taking the point of view of the aggregator, we are now
interested in optimizing the decision parameters to maximize
revenue. Using the classical backward induction method from
game theory [16]2, we first study user reactions to aggregator
decisions, and use the result to compute revenue-maximizing
decisions.
A. User choices and corresponding aggregator revenue
Adding the monetary aspect (prices paid) to the user valu-
ation defined in (2), we get the user utility function:
U = θ(P¯ − γδ(P ))− TCB (5)
The variable T ∈ {Ts, Tr} is the unit energy price set by the
aggregator and chosen by the user. We naturally take T = 0
for users who choose no charging.
For notational simplicity, let us write PA := P¯ − γδ(P ):
therefore PA depends on the regulation signals probabilities
2we indeed have a leader-follower game, with the aggregator as the leader
and users as followers
(ρu, ρd), the default charging power (Pn), and the user reluc-
tance to variations (γ).
We finally assume that the user sensitivity θ is distributed
among EV owners according to an exponential distribution
with mean θ¯.
Figure 2 displays user utility for each of the three choices,
depending on their sensitivity parameter θ.
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Fig. 2: User utility for the three charging options (CB = 50, Pd = 20, PA = 8, Ts = 0.15,
Tr = 0.04): the best choice depends on the user sensitivity θ
Assuming users are rational and choose the option yielding
the highest utility, we can simply compare pairs of options: a
type-θ user prefers
• “S-charging” over “no charging” if θ > TsPdCB
• “R-charging” over “no charging” if θ > TrPACB
• “S-charging” over “R-charging” if θ > Ts−TrPd−PACB .
We have the following two possibilities:
1) If TrPA <
Ts
Pd
then TrPA <
Ts
Pd
< Ts−TrPd−PA , so a user would
chose no charging, R-charging, or S-charging when his
θ falls into the intervals (0, TrPACB), (
Tr
PA
CB ,
Ts−Tr
Pd−PACB)
or ( Ts−TrPd−PACB ,+∞), respectively, the limit cases having
probability zero.
Let us define x := Pn/Pd. The revenue from users
choosing R-charging, computed in (1), can be rewritten
as
Er = ∆tPd(ρurux− ρd(1− rd)(1− x)− x),
and we can express the average aggregator revenue R
per time unit and per EV, as a function of the proportions
αs and αr of users choosing S-charging and R-charging,
respectively.
R = αr(Tr +
Er
P¯∆
)CB + αs(Ts − t)CB (6)
From our reasoning above and our assumption of θ being
exponentially distributed, we have
αr = exp(− Tr
PAθ¯
CB)− exp(− Ts − Tr
(Pd − PA)θ¯
CB) (7)
αs = exp(− Ts − Tr
(Pd − PA)θ¯
CB) (8)
2) If TsPd ≤ TrPA , then we can show that Ts−TrPd−PA ≤ TsPd ≤ TrPA .
A θ-type user then selects S-charging if θ > TsPdCB and
no charging otherwise. Note that the R-charging option
is never chosen. The aggregator revenue per time unit
and per EV becomes
R = αs0(Ts − t)CB (9)
with αs0 the proportion of EVs choosing the S-charging
αs0 = exp(− Ts
Pdθ¯
CB).
Since this price setting is equivalent to the R-charging
option not being offered at all, it will be referred to as
the initial case, where only the possibility of recharging
without regulation participation is offered to EVs.
B. Maximizing the aggregator revenue
We now seek the optimal strategic decisions from the
aggregator point of view.
1) Optimal prices: Summarizing, we have
R(Tr, Ts, x) =

αr(Tr +
Er
P¯∆
)CB + αs(Ts − t)CB
if TrPA <
Ts
Pd
αs0(Ts − t)CB
otherwise,
(10)
where x impacts PA, and αr, αs, αs0 depend on prices and
on PA (hence, also on x) as detailed above.
In order to maximize the aggregator profit in (10), we start
by optimizing the price pair Tr and Ts, considering x fixed.
When TrPA <
Ts
Pd
the Hessian matrix is symmetric and
negative definite, thus the revenue achieves its maximum at
the unique solution of ∂R∂Ts = 0 and
∂R
∂Tr
= 0 [17]; Those
optimal prices are:
T ∗s = t+
Pdθ¯
CB
(11)
T ∗r =
PAθ¯
CB
− Er
P¯∆
; (12)
when TrPA ≥ TsPd , i.e. the initial case, aggregator revenue is
independent of Tr and maximized at the unique solution of
∂R
∂Ts
= 0. Interestingly, this price equals that in (11), meaning
that the price of S-charging remains unchanged no matter it
is offered together with R-charging or not.
Note that the optimal price T ∗r is worth applying only when
the inequality T
∗
r
PA
<
T∗s
Pd
holds, otherwise any larger value
is equivalent since the option is never selected by users (or
equivalently, the aggregator just does not offer that option).
As an illustration, we show in Figure 3 the variation of the
revenue for Ts and Tr that satisfy TrPA <
Ts
Pd
, while x = PnPd is
fixed.
2) Optimal default power Pn: To select the optimal power
Pn at which to charge R-charging EVs in the absence of
regulation signal (or equivalently, the optimal ratio x), we turn
to numerical observations because of analytical intractability.
After repeated trials with different combinations of rd and
ru, we have systematically observed that with the correspond-
ing optimal prices, the revenue seems to be convex in x. A few
sample curves are shown in Figure 4. We therefore conjecture
that the optimal default recharging power is either 0 or the
maximum possible power Pd (i.e., that the optimal x is either
0 or 1). Although we still cannot tell which one performs
better, comparing the revenues yielded by both values can be
easily done numerically.
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Fig. 4: Aggregator Revenue with multiple combinations of rd
and ru
C. When will the aggregator offer an “R-charging” option?
From (10), we can deduce that offering a “R-charging” op-
tion in addition to the “S-charging” one benefits the aggregator
only when the mathematical condition T
∗
r
PA
<
T∗s
Pd
holds, with
the prices T ∗s and T
∗
r given in (11).
If the independent variables of our model
(t, ρd, ρu, rd, ru, θ¯, γ) do not lead to solutions satisfying
this inequality, then there is no room for revenue increment
for the aggregator. In other words, even if some users are
willing to participate to regulation for a discount in their
recharging price, the aggregator will not offer that option
because the rewards are too low.
We now consider in particular the regulation rewards rd
and ru, in order to investigate whether EV-based regulation
will occur or not in some market. We focus on those values
since, being prices, they are easily changeable (from market
conditions or from regulation), and the observed values can
dramatically differ from one market to another, and also
vary significantly over time. Some algebra on the condition
T ∗r /PA < T
∗
s /Pd gives us a new form for that condition:
ρurux− ρd(1− rd)(1− x)− x > P−2d P¯ (P¯ − γδ(P )). (13)
From previous conjectures on the optimal value for x being
1 or 0, we deduce from (14) two inequalities respectively:
ru > 2−ρu+γρ−0.5u (1−ρu)1.5 and rd > 1−ρd+γ
√
ρd − ρ2d,
at least one of those must hold to enable the aggregator to
achieve a higher profit from regulation. We write them in the
form of thresholds for ru and rd:
rminu = 2− ρu + γρ−0.5u (1− ρu)1.5 (14)
rmind = 1− ρd + γ
√
ρd − ρ2d.
When rewards from both up and down regulation are below
those thresholds, (14) cannot hold and no R-charging option
will be offered by the aggregator.
When ru (resp. rd) is above the threshold while rd (resp. ru)
is not, choosing Pn = Pd (resp. Pn = 0) earns the aggregator
more than the initial case; when both of them are above their
thresholds, we cannot tell which one gives higher profit so
both Pn = Pd and Pn = 0 need to be substituted so that the
one yielding the largest revenue can be chosen.
Figure 5 plots user welfare, that is the user utility averaged
over all users, who differ in their sensitivity θ. Note that we
set θ¯ to 0.3 because this yields a S-charging price (T ∗s ) of 0.15
$/kWh, which is the electricity price applied in France.
It is guaranteed that our proposal can never decrease user
welfare since R-charging just provides one more option with-
out increasing the price of S-charging.
Although we don’t bring significant increase in aggregator
revenue, the energy prices for R-charging users are much lower
than that for S-charging, so users achieve higher welfare from
obtaining cheaper energy. For a quite wide region of rewards
(ru ∈ [1.5, 2.1] and rd ∈ [0.5, 0.8]), the R-charging price
(T ∗r ) is typically from 38% (T
∗
r = 0.057 $/kWh, T
∗
s = 0.15
$/kWh) to 48% (T ∗r = 0.072 $/kWh, T
∗
s = 0.15 $/kWh)
of the S-charging price. Finally, comparing Figure 5 with 4
we observe that the x that maximize the aggregator revenue
also maximizes user welfare, hence social welfare will also be
maximized at the same time.
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Fig. 5: User welfare with multiple combinations of rd and ru
IV. APPLICATION IN A REAL WORLD MARKET
The form of the thresholds in (15) confirms that a reduced
user reluctance (γ) to power variance reduces the thresholds,
thus enlarges the region for rewards {rd, ru} leading to R-
charging being offered in existing regulation markets. We use
empirical regulation up and down probabilities (ρu = 49, ρd =
48) found in [14] to calculate the thresholds rmind and r
min
u ,
illustrated by the two lines plotted in Figure 6, one for γ =
0.5 and the other for γ = 0.05. This restates that if batteries
become more robust to power variations, the margin for both
aggregators and user to benefit from R-charging will increase.
To compare the thresholds with the prices actually settled
in a real world market. We plot the ratios of regulation prices
over corresponding wholesale electricity prices on the day of
July 20, 2015 (data from [14], [18]) as well as daily average
prices of that week (from July 20, 2015 to July 26, 2015).
Despite the variations of regulation prices within a day, their
daily averages can still be above our thresholds, hence some
room for the aggregator to contract with the TSO to assure
constant and viable regulation prices throughout the day. To
illustrate how the aggregator should set the default power Pn,
we also show the region where Pn = 0 or Pn = Pd is the
optimal default charging power for R-charging.
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V. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
This paper proposes a control mechanism for an aggregator
in charge of several charging stations for Electric Vehicles.
We find frequency regulation a promising market for the
aggregator, who can provide regulation up (down) by de-
creasing (increasing) the recharging power of electric vehicles.
Following the pricing policy we optimized, not only does the
aggregator increase its revenue but also cheaper energy is
offered to the EV owners. We highlight that even if EVs appear
as a valuable asset for regulation because of their tolerance to
changes in the consumed power, the revenue-oriented behavior
of aggregators can dramatically affect the extent of regulation
effectively provided by EVs. Under reasonable assumptions,
the aggregator may even just not offer the possibility to par-
ticipate in regulation, hence annihilating one of the leverages
brought by the advent of EVs. Therefore, the incentives to
participate in regulation should be carefully studied, so that the
grid actually benefits from the considerable (and distributed)
demand flexibility offered by EVs.
Directions for future work include considering competing
aggregators (in our study, the aggregator is a monopoly).
Another interesting direction is to assume that the potential
EV-based regulation supply exceeds the grid needs, leading
to dispatching problems for the regulation capacities and
revenues. This could be the case in an isolated grid or micro-
grid with small regulation demand.
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